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MILITARY LAW-Military Jurisdiction over Crimes
Committed hy Military Personnel Outside the
United States: The Effect of O'Callahan

v. Parker
The authority of Congress to bestow upon the armed forces
exclusive jurisdiction over military offenses is derived from article I,
section 8 of the Constitution, which grants Congress the power to
"make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval Forces."1 In addition, because disciplinary requirements make

1. This power has been exercised by Congress by conferring jurisdiction on the
military in the Uniform Code of Military Justice [hereinafter UCMJ] art, 2, 10 U.S.C.
§ 802 (1964), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1965-1968).
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impracticable the application in military trials of all of the procedural
safeguards afforded defendants in civilian trials, the Constitution
specifically provides that certain of these safeguards need not be
recognized by military courts.2 For example, the fifth amendment's
requirement for grand jury indictment is specifically exempted in
"cases arising in the land and naval forces." 3 This exemption has also
been interpreted to remove from the military court system the jury
trial requirement of the sixth amendment. 4 In addition to these
express constitutional mandates concerning procedural exemptions,
there also exists a traditional skepticism as to the ability of the
military establishment to provide tribunals with other procedural
qualifications "deemed essential to fair trials of civilians." 5 At least
on the surface, then, it seems clear that a criminal defendant is the
beneficiary of significantly fewer procedural safeguards when he is
tried in a military court than he is when he is tried in a civilian
court. Consequently, it is essential that there be well-defined criteria
for determining when military jurisdiction should attach.
Until recently, it had generally been considered that the minimum condition necessary to justify the invocation of military jurisdiction was the offender's "status" as "a person who can be regarded
as falling within the term 'land and naval forces.' " 6 In O' Callahan
2. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 261 (1969).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 40 (1942); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
2, 123 (1866).
5. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955):
And conceding to military personnel that high degree of honesty and sense of
justice which nearly all of them undoubtedly have, it still remains true that
military tribunals have not been and probably never can be constituted in such
way that they can have the same kind of qualification that the Constitution has
deemed essential to fair trials of civilians in federal courts. For instance, the Constitution does not provide life tenure for those performing judicial functions in
military trials. They are appointed by military commanders and may be removed
at will. Nor does the Constitution protect their salaries as it does judicial salaries.
Strides have been made toward making courts-martial less subject to the will of the
e.xecutive department which appoints, supervises and ultimately controls them.
But from the very nature of things, courts have more independence in passing on
the life and liberty of people than do military tribunals.
Action has been undertaken, however, to alleviate some of the more serious objections to trial by a military tribunal. See generally Mounts &: Sugarman, The Military
Justice Act of 1968, 55 A.B.A.J. 470 (1969); Nelson &: Westbrook, Court-Martial Jurisdiction over Servicemen for "Civilian" Offenses: An Analysis of O'Callahan v. Parker,
54 MINN. L. REv. l, 56-64 (1969); Quinn, Some Comparisons Between Courts-Martial
and Civilian Practice, 15 UCLA L. REv. 1240 (1968). See also Bishop, The Quality of
Military Justice, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 32.
6. See Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 241 (1960); Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. l (1957); Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907); Johnson v.
Sayre, 158 U.S. 109 (1895); Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167 (1886); Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509 (1879); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). See also the dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan in O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 275 (1969),
noting that prior to that decision, military status had consistently been considered by
the Court as a "necessary and sufficient condition for the exercise of court martial
jurisdiction."
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v. Parker,7 however, the United States Supreme Court determined
that while military status is still requisite to the attachment of
military jurisdiction, it is not a sufficient basis in and of itself to
warrant trial by a military tribunal. In a five to three decision authored by Justice Douglas, the Court held that in order for military
jurisdiction to attach, the crimes for which prosecution is sought
must have been "service-connected."8 Thus, there has emerged a twopronged test for ascertaining the proper attachment of court-martial
jurisdiction: (1) the offender must have the status of being a member
of the armed forces, and (2) the offense must be service-connected.
The ramifications of this dramatic development in military law
are extensive. Because the Court in O'Callahan established new
standards to be met at the initial jurisdictional stages of the judicial
process, the effect of the decision may be expected to pervade almost
all aspects of military justice.0 A particularly significant issue is
raised by the application of the decision in foreign locations, ·where
the denial of military jurisdiction presents intricate practical problems which do not result from a similar denial in domestic situations.
The purpose of this Note, then, is to examine the O'Callahan holding
with regard to its applicability to situations involving crimes of a
nonmilitary nature committed by servicemen while serving under
peacetime conditions in foreign countries.
I.

THE HOLDING AND IMPACT OF Q'CALLAHAN

The defendant involved in the O'Callahan decision was an Army
sergeant stationed in Hawaii; while on leave and in civilian clothes,
he broke into a girl's hotel room and assaulted and attempted to
rape her. He was convicted at a court-martial on charges of attempted
rape, housebreaking, and assault with intent to rape.10 His conviction
was affirmed by the Army Board of Review and by the United States
Court of Military Appeals. 11 A petition for a writ of habeas corpus
was denied by a United States district court without discussion of
the merits,12 and the denial was subsequently affirmed by the United
7. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
8. 395 U.S. at 272.
9. For an extensive analysis of the practical effects and implications of O'Callahan
v. Parker, as it applies to the military generally, see Nelson &: Westbrook, supra note
5. See also Everett, O'Callahan v. Parker-Milestone or Millstone in Military Justice7,
1969 DUKE L.J. 853; Note, Denial of Military Jurisdiction over Servicemen's Crimes
Having No Military Significance and Cognizable in Civilian Courts, 64 Nw. U. L. REv.
930 (1970).
10. These are offenses under the UCMJ arts. 80, 130, 134, 10 U.S.C. §§ 880, 930, 934
(1964).
11. United States v. O'Callahan, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 568, 37 C.M.R. 188 (1967).
12. United States ex rel. O'Callahan v. Parker, 256 F. Supp. 679 (M.D. Pa. 1966).
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States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.13 The Supreme Court
then granted certiorari to consider the limited issues:
Does a court-martial ... have jurisdiction to tty a member of the
Armed Forces who is charged with commission of a crime cognizable
in a civilian court and having no military significance, alleged to
have been committed off post and while on leave, thus depriving
him of his constitutional rights to indictment by grand jury and trial
by a petit jury in a civilian court?14
In deciding this question, the Court in O'Callahan emphasized
that the military court-martial lacked important procedural provisions. The Court concluded that the advantages of a grand jury
indictment and of trial by jury were not to be denied inexorably to
members of the armed forces, but rather that the authority of the
military to take jurisdiction is limited to situations in which the
denial of such protections is based on the "special needs of the
military." 15 Hence, the Court established the "service-connected"
test. In so reversing the petitioner's conviction, Justice Douglas stated
that certain of the facts incident to O'Callahan's crimes removed
those offenses from the scope of service-connection and therefore
placed them beyond the limits of the military's judicial competence.
Justice Douglas then enumerated those facts:
In the present case petitioner was properly absent from his military base when he committed the crimes with which he is charged.
There ·was no connection-not even the remotest one-between his
military duties and the crimes in question. The crimes were not committed on a military post or enclave; nor was the person whom he
attacked performing any duties relating to the military. Moreover,
Hawaii, the situs of the crime, is not an armed camp under military
control, as are some of our far-flung outposts.
Finally, we deal with peacetime offenses, not with authority
l!I. United States ex -rel. O'Callahan v. Parker, 390 F.2d 360 (3d Cir. 1968).
14. O'Callahan v. Parker, 393 U.S. 822 (1968).
15. !195 U.S. at 262·67, 272-73.
It should be noted at this point, however, that there may be some confusion as to
the exact basis of the Court's objection in O'Callahan to the procedural adequacy of
courts-martial. While the objection is specifically declared to be founded on the desire
to pre~erve the~e "two important constitutional guarantees"-that is, the rights to
grand-jury indictment and trial by jury-395 U.S. at 273, the majority opinion devoted
substantial effort to demonstrating that not only do military courts deny these two
specific constitutional safeguards, but also that they are consituted and conducted in
such a way as to make them "singularly inept in dealing with the nice subtleties of
constitutional law," which are essential to the implementation of a fair trial. 395 U.S.
at 265. Thus, while the case might, at first blush, be considered as resting merely on
the denial of the rights to grand-jury indictment and jury trial, it appears that the
Court relied, at least to some extent, on the inherent infirmities of military tribunals
as guarantors of a "fair trial" as that term is understood in the civilian courts. See
Nelson &: We~tbrook, supra note 5, at 34 n.167.
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stemming from the war power. Civil courts were open. The offenses
were committed within our territorial limits, not in the occupied
zone of a foreign country. The offenses did not involve any question
of the flouting of military authority, the security of a military post,
or the integrity of military property.1 0

As is lamented by Justice Harlan in his dissent,17 the majority
opinion has, by this enumeration, failed to illuminate to any meaningful extent the general criteria for determining when an offense
is service-connected. Instead, the listed factors, hinged as they are
on the specific facts of the case, suggest at best only particular
situations which indicate an absence of military significance. Nonetheless, it seems that if any meaningful principles for the future
application of O'Callahan are to emerge from the decision, they will
have to be gleaned from the implications of these factors. In this
connection, two commentators have suggested that to require strict
adherence to these specific factors in every case in order to support
a finding of no service-connection would be effectively to emasculate
the thrust of O'Callahan by limiting its application to situations in
which the facts involved are substantially similar to the facts of
O'Callahan. 18 The correct approach, therefore, should not be one
of viewing each factor as absolute and indispensible but rather as
one of enlisting these factors as aids or weighing elements in the
determination of whether the particular crime in question is sufficiently related to the military that it can justify trial in military
courts.19
In order to utilize these factors as meaningful indicators of
whether military jurisdiction should attach, it is necessary to understand the underlying concern that was intended to be encompassed
by the term "service-connected." As is noted specifically by the
majority opinion in O'Callahan; the justification for the implementation of a specialized system of military courts is derived from the
concept of the "special needs of the military." 2° Furthermore, the
general thrust of the opinion indicates a concern for the diminution
of liberty that is perpetrated by an expansion of jurisdiction beyond
the extent required by military exigencies. Thus, the requirement
that there be a finding of service-connection in order to warrant the
imposition of military jurisdiction seems to embrace the notion that
the term "service-connected" embodies an assurance that the crime
16.
17.
18.
19.

395 U.S. at 2i3-74.
395 U.S. at 274-75.

Nelson&: Westbrook, supra note 5, at 26.
In this connection, see Nelson &: Vvestbrook, supra note 5, at 29-32, suggesting a
"multi-factor" approach to the determination of service-connection.
20. 395 U.S. at 265.
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in issue is of sufficient military significance to create a special military need for the disposition of the matter within the military system.
In light of this concern for special needs, it appears that the function
of the enunciated factors is to focus attention in the particular case
on the underlying need of the military for acquiring jurisdiction.
Thus, while the factors may be used as guidelines in the determination of service-connection, they should not become ends in themselves.
II.

THE "SERVICE-CONNECTED" TEST A.BROAD: SCOPE OF THE
PROBLEM

As indicated previously, the purpose of this Note is to examine
the O' Callahan holding in the context of the problems peculiar to
its application outside of the territorial confines of the United States.
To isolate these particular problems, this Note will assume that the
crime or offense in question is sufficiently unrelated to the military
that under O'Callahan it would clearly be outside of the scope of
military jurisdiction but for the fact that it was committed by a
serviceman while serving in a foreign country. Thus, it is to be accepted in the discussion of any problem throughout this Note that
all of the O'Callahan factors necessary to obviate military jurisdiction
have been satisfied except those which relate to the fact that the
crime was committed beyond the territorial limits of the United
States. For example, it can be assumed that the offense was committed
off-post, while the offender was out of uniform, and that the alleged
crime had no connection whatsoever with the offender's military
duties. Moreover, because the present discussion concerns a peacetime situation, two other factors which might otherwise apply in a
foreign setting can also be considered inapplicable: it can be assumed
that the offense in question was not committed either in "an armed
camp under military control, as are some of our far-flung outposts"21
or "in the occupied zone of a foreign country."22 These last two
factors are rendered inapplicable by delineating the present scope
of analysis to include only those powers of Congress that may be exercised in times of peace for the general implementation of "military
justice"; excluded are those powers involved in situations of "martial
law" and those exercisable under the "war powers."23
It seems clear, then, that the single factor emerging from the
O' Callahan decision which does not support the immediate denial of
21. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
22. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
23. For discussions of the differences among military law or justice, the law of war,
and martial law, and of the various constitutional powers under which each is invoked,
see Everett, Military Jurisdiction over Civilians, 1960 DUKE L.J. 366-70; Girard, The
Constitution and Court-Martial of Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces-A Preliminary Analysis, 13 STAN. L. R.Ev. 461, 463 (1961); Nelson &: Westbrook, supra note 5,
at 52-55.

1022

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 68

military jurisdiction in the foreign context is that the "[c]ivil courts
[may not be] open." 24 If military jurisdiction is denied and no
adequate alternative civilian tribunal is available, the offense may
go unpunished; such a situation could have adverse effects on military discipline and could lead to potential conflicts with the government and people of the host state. If a civilian court is available,
however, so that the offender may be prosecuted and punished, the
fear of unrestrained criminal activity is largely eradicated. It may
become necessary, therefore, in order to avert the attachment of
military jurisdiction, to demonstrate the availability of an adequate
alternative tribunal which can dispose of the offense involved and
can thereby fulfill the military's special needs to preserve discipline
and to maintain amicable relations with the host nation.

III.

ALTERNATIVE CIVILIAN COURTS AS AN ABSOLUTE REQUIREMENT

Before turning to the question of the accessibility of alternative
fora, it is important to examine the underlying assumption that such
an alternative is an absolute prerequisite to the evasion of the
military's jurisdictional grasp. As stated above, this assumption is
founded on the notion that the military's needs for maintaining
internal discipline and favorable relations with the host state are
sufficient grounds to justify the imposition of a military trial when
no civilian courts are available, even though the offense in question
is otherwise unrelated to the military. Thus, it is necessary to determine whether this conception is a valid basis for vesting an offense
otherwise independent of the military with a sufficient military connection that court-martial jurisdiction is proper. I£ such a basis is inadequate to justify a military trial, the issue of available alternatives
becomes moot and the attachment of military jurisdiction is effectively precluded.
In its consideration of cases involving the O'Callahan doctrine,
the United States Court of Military Appeals has apparently held that
alternative civilian courts are indispensible to the frustration of
military jurisdiction. In the initial case construing O'Callahan, the
military court, in holding that the military is without jurisdiction
to try a soldier for crimes committed off-post, while off duty, and
against civilians, emphasized that in no fewer than eight instances
did Justice Douglas' opinion in O'Callahan refer to the availability
of civilian courts.25 From this fact the Court of Military Appeals
24. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
25. United States v. Borys, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 547, 549, 40 C.M:.R. 257 (1969):
The grant of certiorari itself refers to crimes cognizable " 'in a civilian court' "
and accused's right to " 'trial by a petit jury in a civilian court,'" [O'Callahan v.
Parker, 395 U.S. at 261]; the opinion adverts to the practices "obtaining in the
regular courts," id., page 265; to a "civilian trial," id., page 266; to "the 'Ordinary
Process of Law,'" id., page 269; to "civil, not military courts,'' id., page 270; to
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concluded that if no service-connection can be found, the defendant
"is to be relegated to the civil authorities." 26 This basic attitude,
stressing the reliance on civilian courts to dispose of matters so excluded from military cognizance, has been crystallized in subsequent
decisions of the military court construing O'Callahan.27 Typical of
this attitude is the court's broad declaration in United States v.
Keaton that "[e]ssential to this holding [that a court-martial is
without jurisdiction] is the fact that the crime must be cognizable
in the civil courts of the United States. . . ."28 Thus, it appears
that the approach adopted by the highest military tribunal absolutely
requires the availability of an alternative civilian court in order to
overcome the military's special needs.
The Court of Military Appeals is not, of course, the final expositor of the issue.20 Nevertheless, its conclusions are relevant since
it is the tribunal which will probably formulate the present operating
standards for the "service-connected" test; 30 and it is likely that if
these standards are at all acceptable within the evolving framework
of the O'Callahan doctrine, the Supreme Court, as newly constituted,
will be reluctant to encroach further on military jurisdiction.31 The
"trials ••• in civil courts,'' id., page 271; and to the "[c]ivil courts" as being open,
id., at page 273 (emphasis supplied). Finally, the Court decided that, "since petitioner's crimes were not service connected, he could not be tried by court-martial
but rather was entitled to trial by the civilian courts." Id., at page 274. (Emphasis
supplied.)
26. 18 U.S.C.M.A. at 549.
27. See, e.g., the following decisions in which the availability of alternative civilian
courts is listed as a factor leading to the conclusion that the military courts are without
jurisdiction: United States v. McGonical, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 94, 41 C.M.R. 94 (1969); United
States v. Salford, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 33, 41 C.M.R. 33 (1969); United States v. Armes, 19
U.S.C.M.A. 15, 41 C.M.R. 15 (1969); United States v. Armstrong, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 5, 41
C.M.R. 5 (1969); United States v. Shockley, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 610, 40 C.M.R. 322 (1969);
United States v. Williams, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 605, 40 C.M.R. 317 (1969); United States v.
Riehle, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 603, 40 C.M.R. 315 (1969); United States v. Castro, 18 U.S.C.M.A.
598, 40 C.M.R. 310 (1969); United States v. Chandler, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 593, 40 C.M.R. 305
(1969); United States v. Prather, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 560, 40 C.M.R. 272 (1969).
28. 19 U.S.C.M.A. 64, 65, 41 C.M.R. 64 (1969).
29. Since the issue is a constitutional one, the ultimate authority for determining
it lies in the United States Supreme Court. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
30. Since further interpretation of O'Callahan will take place in a military context,
it is in that area that future cases will arise and consequently final exposition within
the military will be made by the Court of Military Appeals. Interpretation of O'Callahan by the military court has already preceded such disposition in the federal district
courts. See notes 25-28 supra and accompanying text.
!11. At the time of the decision in O'Callahan, Justice Fortas had resigned, leaving
only eight Justices to render the decision. There were five Justices constituting the
majority-Justices Douglas, Black, Brennan, Marshall, and Chief Justice Warren. Since
that time, Chief Justice Warren's resignation has been accepted and Chief Justice
Burger has succeeded him to the bencl1. At present, no one has been confirmed as a
successor to Justice Fortas' seat. It is to be noted that Chief Justice Burger has expressed less than a receptive attitude toward limiting military jurisdiction. See his
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military court's holdings with regard to civilian alternatives, however, appear to have been based merely on the literal language of
O'Callahan and do not seem to have made any meaningful analysis
of the underlying concepts.32 Thus, in light of the limited conclusiveness of the military court's decisions, and in light of the somewhat
sketchy analysis which it employed, it becomes necessary to ascertain
whether the Court of Military Appeals' absolute requirement for
an alternative civilian forum is an acceptable consequence of O' Callahan.
The series of Supreme Court decisions from which O'Callahan
can fairly be said to have descended33 may arguably be seen as
support for the proposition that alternative fora are not absolutely
necessary to divest the military of jurisdiction over crimes committed
by servicemen outside of the United States. This line of cases, commonly referred to as the "Reid line," in effect prohibited the military
from taking jurisdiction over crimes committed by civilians accompanying the armed forces abroad. 34 The crimes involved in those
cases, like that in O'Callahan, were committed in foreign countries
and at least implicitly involved the question whether there were
alternative courts in which the crimes could be tried. The Supreme
Court, however, was not compelled to discuss at any length the
problem of alternative tribunals, even though the inescapable result
was that the offenses involved went unpunished. 35 Instead, the Court
apparently was concerned only with the fact that the civilians who
had committed the crimes did not possess the requisite status as
members of the armed forces. Although the effect on discipline in
these cases would admittedly have been less severe than it was in
O'Callahan, there nonetheless was at least some justification for
military jurisdiction in the Reid line of cases, since an adverse effect
on relations with the host country might have resulted from allowing
dissent as a judge of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in
United States ex rel. Guagliardo v. McElroy, 259 F.2d 927, 933 (D.C. Cir. 1958), afjd.,
361 U.S. 281 (1960).
32. See, e.g., the analysis of the court in United States v. Keaton, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 64,
41 C.M.R. 64 (1969). The decision of the issue in this case was not necessary to the
disposition of the case. 19 U.S.C.M.A. at 67. See also United States v. l3orys, 18
U.S.C.M.A. 547, 40 C.M.R. 257 (1969), and the cases listed in note 27 supra.
33. See McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960); Grisham
v. Haten, 361 U.S. 278 (1960); Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234
(1960); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. l (1957); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S.
11 (1955). The importance of these cases to the decision of O'Callahan is exemplified
by the extensive reference to them in the opinion. 395 U.S. at 262-67.
34. In Quarles, the military was denied jurisdiction over an ex-serviceman even for
crimes committed while he was in the military.
35. See Duke &: Vogel, The Constitution and the Standing Army: Another Problem
of Court-Martial Jurisdiction, 13 VAND. L. REv. 435, 435-38 (1960). According to former
Chief Justice Warren, however, the Court apparently was not totally insensitive to the
problems created by the restriction of court-martial jurisdiction. Warren, The Bill
of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 181, 195 (1962).
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the crimes to go unpunished. It appears, however, that the Court
was largely unconcerned with the satisfaction of the military's special
needs thus created by its decisions. By permitting the crimes committed in those cases to go uncorrected, the Court seems to have
indicated that, even when civil courts are not accessible, these special
needs of the military are not sufficiently persuasive to justify the
extension of military jurisdiction to crimes committed by civilians.
Despite the Court's apparent indifference in the past toward the
unavailability of alternative courts for the prosecution of the crimes
in these analogous situations, Justice Douglas emphasized in the
O'Callahan opinion that the availability of alternative civilian courts
was a crucial consideration in determining service-connection.36 This
apparent departure from precedent can, however, be explained by
the differences in the bases of analysis in each respective situation.
With respect to crimes committed by civilians, apparently no amount
of special needs may confer jurisdiction on the military tribunals,
because the crucial determination in that situation is merely whether
the offender possesses the requisite status as a member of the armed
forces. 37 In the analysis of offenses by servicemen, however, such
status has already been ascertained and-the question is one of military need. Since the consideration of alternative fora as an element
in the determination of service-connection stems from the concept
of special military need, it appears that in the area of crimes committed by civilians, in which the military's special needs are irrelevant, the availability of alternative fora is likewise irrelevant.
Consequently, the distinction in status between a civilian and a
serviceman seems to preclude the use of the Reid line to argue that
an adequate alternative forum is not a prerequisite to depriving the
military of jurisdiction.
Thus, in light of the frequent mention in O'Callahan of available
civilian tribunals, in light of the emphasis which the Court of Military Appeals has placed on the availability of these tribunals, and
in light of the very real need to control discipline both within the
military structure and within the foreign host nation, it does not
seem improvident to conclude that the availability of a civilian
disciplinary tribunal is absolutely required in order to remove the
offense in question from the realm of military jurisdiction.

IV.

THE EFFECT OF STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENTS

The location of the crime in a foreign nation raises a supplementary issue which must be examined prior to undertaking an
analysis of what alternative civilian tribunals are available. That
!16. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
!17. See note 6 supra and accompanying text. See also Latney v. Ignatious, 416 F.2d
821 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (strictly construing the dicta in O'Callahan that civilians may
never be tried in military courts); Nelson &: Westbrook, supra note 5, at 54-55.
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further issue is prompted by the Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA)
which are in effect between the United States and virtually every
nation in which American troops are stationed.38
The SOFA which has been in effect for the longest period of time,
and the one which has served as a model for most other SOFAs,
is the NATO SOFA.89 The NATO SOFA provides that jurisdiction
over crimes committed in foreign countries by members of visiting
forces be allocated between the sending and receiving states. The
agreement confers on each respective government exclusive jurisdiction over crimes which are cognizable under that government's
law, but which are not cognizable under the law of the other nation.40 Over all other crimes, concurrent jurisdiction by both the
sending and receiving states is recognized, with primary-or firstchoice-jurisdiction designated according to specified criteria. Under
these criteria, the host state is vested with primary jurisdiction over
all such offenses unless (a) the offense is "solely against the property
or security of [the sending] State, or [is] solely against the person or
property of another member of the force or civilian component of that
State or of a dependent," or (b) the offense arises out of the "performance of official duty. " 41
38. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces [hereinafter NATO SOFA], June 19, 1951, [1953] 4
U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2845 (effective Aug. 23, 1953); Agreement Concerning the
Status of United States Forces in Australia, May 9, 1963, [1963] 14 U.S.R. 506, T.I.A.S.
No. 5394 (effective May 9, 1963), as amended, July 12, 1968, T.I.A.S. No. 6527; Agreement with the Republic of China on the Status of United States Armed Forces in the
Republic of China, Aug. 31, 1965, [1966] 17 U.S.T. 373, T.I.A.S. No. 5968 (effective
April 12, 1966); Agreement Under Art. VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
Security with Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in
Japan, Jan. 19, 1960, [1960] 11 U.S.T. 1652, T.I.A.S. No. 4510 (effective June 23, 1960);
Agreement Under Art. IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of Korea
Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in the
Republic of Korea, July 9, 1966, [1966] 17 U.S.T. 1677, T.I.A.S. No. 6127 (effective
Feb. 9, 1967). For a general discussion of Status of Forces Agreements [hereinafter
SOFA], see Carlisle, Offidal Duty Certificates Under Status of Forces Agreements, 20
JAG J. 95 (1966).
39. See note 38 supra. This is the SOFA existing between the United States and
every NATO nation in which the United States has troops stationed. Since SOFAs in
effect with countries other than NATO countries are based largely on this NATO
SOFA, this agreement should be considered as in effect throughout the remainder of
this Note, except when otherwise designated.
40. NATO SOFA art. VII, 1f 2:
(a) The military authorities of the sending State shall have the right to e.xercise exclusive jurisdiction over persons subject to the military law of that State
with respect to offenses, including offenses relating to its security, punishable by
the law of the sending State, but not by the law of the receiving state.
(b) The authorities of the receiving State shall have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over members of a force or civilian component and their dependents with respect to offenses, including offenses relating to the security of
that State, punishable by its law but not by the law of the sending State.
41. NATO SOFA art. VII, 1f 3:
In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent the following rules
shall apply:
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These standards established by the NATO SOFA are obviously
meant to allow the military authorities of the sending state to retain
control over offenses relating primarily to military matters. They
seem to coincide, at least partially, with the standards articulated by
Justice Douglas for establishing service-connection.42 Although the
similarities between the two standards are less than complete, it
seems that, by following the SOFA provisions, the United States
has been practicing a form of the "service-connected" test ever
since the adoption of the NATO SOFA in 1953. The question
emerging from these similarities is whether the differences between
the two sets of standards are sufficiently immaterial to make feasible
the satisfaction of the O'Callahan requirements merely by application of the NATO SOFA provisions. A finding of sufficient correlation in this regard would make largely irrelevant any further
discussion concerning the availability of alternative tribunals, because the existing SOFA system, which is apparently constitutionally
valid,43 would operate to alleviate the concerns encompassed by such
a discussion.
There are several objections to utilizing the NATO SOFA in
this manner. The United States, under the NATO SOFA, has retained concurrent juisdiction over a wide range of offenses and has,
as a matter of course, requested waiver of jurisdiction by the host
state in almost all cases.44 Moreover, the host state is under no
compulsion to exercise its jurisdiction, and in fact it is often reluctant to do so, especially when the crimes are primarily against Amer(a) The military authorities of the sending State shall have the primary right to
exercise jmisdiction over a member of a force or of a civilian component in
relation to
(i) offenses solely against the property or security of that State, or offenses
solely against the person or property of another member of the force or
civilian component of that State or of a dependent;
(ii) offenses arising out of any act or omission done in the performance of
official duty.
(b) In the case of any other offense the authorities of the receiving State shall have
the primary right to exercise jurisdiction.
(c) If the State having the primary right decides not to exercise jurisdiction, it
shall notify the authorities of the other State as soon as practicable. The authorities of the State having the primary right shall give sympathetic consideration
to a request from the authorities of the other State for a waiver of its right in
cases where that other State considers such waiver to be of particular importance.
42. See text accompanying note 16 mpra.
43. Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524- (1957). See discussion in text accompanying notes
6·!-70 infra.
44. See Carlisle, supra note 38, at 96; Levie, The NATO Status of Forces Agreement:
Legal Safeguards for American Servicemen, 44 A.B.A.J. 322 (1958). The NATO SOFA
provides for the recognition of such waivers:
The authorities of the State having the primary right [to jurisdiction] shall give
sympathetic consideration to a request from the authorities of the other State
for a waiver of its right in cases where that other State considers such waiver to
be of particular importance.
Art. VII, 1f 3(c).
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ican citizens or property or otherwise inimical to American interests.4 i;
If the NATO SOFA should be applied instead of the O'Callahan
"service-connected" test, such waivers of jurisdiction would greatly
increase the scope of American military jurisdiction, thereby frustrating the primary aim of O' Callahan. Even if this increased scope
of military jurisdiction could be eliminated by simply abandoning
the waiver requests, there would still persist a "jurisdictional gap"
caused by the failure of local authorities to prosecute.46 Under the
"special needs" approach, it does not seem that foreign relations
would be damaged by such a failure to prosecute, since the foreign
nation could not realistically complain about disruptive behavior
that is occasioned by its mrn failure to acquire jurisdiction. Nonetheless, internal disciplinary problems in the military would remain.
Furthermore, foreign relations could quite conceivably be damaged
by the increased burden placed on local foreign courts by the sudden
abandonment of waiver requests. While there are difficulties in
evaluating empirically the effects of attempting to implement O'Callahan by utilizing the SOFAs,47 it appears from this cursory analysis
that many of the practical problems which the "service-connected"
test is intended to remedy could be expected to persevere as a result
of the application of the NATO SOFA provisions.
Moreover, it appears that in practice the determination of a
military connection under the existing provisions of the SOFAs has
not rested on particularly meaningful criteria. This inefficient application of the SOFA provisions has resulted largely from the
indiscriminate issuance by military commanders of "official duty
certificates." 48 The history behind the negotiation of the NATO
SOFA indicates that as differences between nations arose concerning
the proper allocation of jurisdiction in particular cases, the determination by the sending state that the crime was committed by the
serviceman in the performance of an "official duty" was to take
precedence, with areas of grave differences to be decided by diplomatic resolution. 49 In carrying out this function, some American
military commanders have developed the practice of issuing certificates of official duty somewhat indiscriminately and without formulating any distinct bases for their decisions. As a result, recourse
45. See Ehrenhaft, Policing Civilians Accompanying the United States Armed
Forces Overseas: Can United States Commissioners Fill the Jurisdictional Gap?, 36 GEO.
WASH. L. R.Ev. 273, 276-80 (1967). See also Girard, supra note 23, at 505-06.
46. See discussion of the jurisdictional gap in text accompanying note 98 infra.
47. A full-scale empirical analysis is beyond the scope of this Note. However, the
data compiled in Ehrenhaft, supra note 45, and its analysis at 276-78, may be of some
assistance in making such an evaluation.
48. See Carlisle, supra note 38; Ward, Criminal Law and Jurisdiction over American Servicemen in Japan, 52 A.B.A.J. 61, 62 (1966).
49. Carlisle, supra note 38, at 96.
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to diplomatic channels has often been required, and the smooth
functioning of the SOFA provisions has accordingly been impaired. 150
While in some instances mechanisms for handling these disputes
efficiently have developed, 61 it seems that the SOFA provisions, as
presently employed, may be expected only to approximate the
O' Callahan standards. Although reform in the operation of the
system appears to be long overdue,62 an unrestricted recommendation
of the NATO SOFA as a method of effecting the "service-connected"
standards of O'Callahan must await the implementation and scrutinization of such reforms.
V.

FOREIGN CIVILIAN COURTS AS AVAILABLE ALTERNATIVE
TRIBUNALS

Having disposed of the preliminary issues, the focus of attention
may now be turned to the question of the availability of alternative
civilian courts. Since the absolute requirement for an alternative
tribunal is founded on the proposition that such courts are necessary
to obviate the military's special needs of preserving discipline and
maintaining favorable relations with the host state, it follows that
in order for the alternative tribunal invoked to supply a satisfactory
basis for the denial of court-martial jurisdiction, that tribunal must
be constituted so as to satisfy these military needs. Thus, the requirement that an alternative forum be available in order to justify
the frustration of military jurisdiction seems to contemplate more
than a theoretical alternative. It seems also to require a tribunal
that is competent to meet the special military needs and thereby to
remove the necessity of disciplinary judicial procedures within the
military. The approach to be followed, therefore, in the analysis of
the alternative-forum issue, must include not only the initial search
for available civilian courts, but also an examination of the abilities
of such courts to fulfill the special needs of the military.
In the initial search for potential alternative courts, the tribunal
that emerges from the NATO SOFA's allocations of jurisdiction
as most obvious is the civilian court system of the host country. For
all but that narrow range of offenses over which the United States
has retained exclusive jurisdiction,53 the SOFA provisions call either
for exclusive jurisdiction in the host country or for concurrent
jurisdiction in the host and sending countries. 54 Thus, it appears
50. Id.
51. In Japan, for example, when notice is given by Japanese officials of their
nonconcurrence in American determinations of official duty, the issue is submitted for
resolution to a joint committee composed of high-ranking American and Japanese
officials. See Ward, supra note 48, at 62.
52. See Carlisle, supra note 38.
53. See the NATO SOFA provisions at note 40 supra.
54. See the NATO SOFA provisions at notes 40-41 supra.
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that these foreign tribunals are readily available for the prosecution
of crimes unrelated to military service.
Prior to an examination of the internal qualifications of these
courts, it must be determined whether these foreign tribunals fall
within the range of civilian courts that was contemplated by the
language of O' Callahan or whether that opinion limits the acceptable
range of choices to courts within the United States. Since the majority
opinion in O'Callahan referred only to "civilian courts" ·without
specifying any particular tribunals as acceptable, ms there emerges
from the decision no apparent reason for restricting the acceptable
alternatives to American tribunals. Indeed, the Court of Military
Appeals, in its decision in United States v. Borys/• 6 stressed that
Justice Douglas had written of civilian courts in contrast to military
courts; and it thereby implied that foreign civilian courts might fall
within the range of acceptable alternatives. 157 The military court,
however, has subsequently retreated from this potentially liberal interpretation of O'Callahan 58 and has stated in United States v.
Keaton 59 that in order to negate court-martial jurisdiction, it is
essential that the offense "be cognizable in the civil courts of the
United States, ... and that such courts be open and functioning." 60
This restrictive interpretation by the Court of Military Appeals has
apparently stemmed from the conclusion that foreign courts are
procedurally inadequate to supplant military jurisdiction, because
they fail to guarantee the "benefits of indictment and trial by jury." 61
The military court reasoned that, since a similar failure had been
the basis of the objection to the military court-martial in O'Callahan,
a tribunal providing equally deficient procedures could not serve as
a viable alternative. In light of the special-needs rationale of the
"service-connected" test, however, it is not readily apparent what military exigencies are satisfied by the imposition of this limitation on
acceptable alternative courts. Nonetheless, the indisputable logic of
the Court of Military Appeals persists. Because the military court's
statement in Keaton concerning alternative tribunals was not neces55.
56.
text.
57.
58.

See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
18 U.S.C.M.A. 547, 40 C.M.R. 257 (1969). See note 25 supra and accompanying

18 U.S.C.M.A. at 549.
While the language quoted seems to indicate the liberality of the coun in
Borys, placing that language in the context of the entire opinion may cast doubts on
the validity of this conclusion.
59. 19 U.S.C.M.A. 64, 41 C.M.R. 64 (1969). Accord, United States v. Blackwell, 19
U.S.C.M.A. 196, 41 C.M.R. 196 (1970); United States v. Bryan, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 184, 41
C.M.R. 184 (1970); United States v. Easter, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 68, 41 C.M.R. 68 (1969);
United States v. Stevenson, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 69, 41 C.M.R. 69 (1969).
60. 19 U.S.C.M.A. at 65.
61. 19 U.S.C.M.A. at 67.
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sary to the decision, 62 and because the implication of that statement
would place a severe restriction on the application of O' Callahan to
crimes committed by servicemen in foreign countries, it is essential
to examine the validity of the military court's conclusion. 63
A. The Need To Examine Comparative Procedures

At the outset it should be asked whether a comparison of the
procedures of foreign courts with those of courts in the United States
is a relevant aspect of the "service-connected" test. As noted by the
Court of Miliarty Appeals, O'Callahan is based on the determination
that the American court-martial is procedurally deficient and therefore should be denied jurisdiction over the prosecution of crimes
so long as no special military necessities outweigh this inherent
procedural incompetency. From this basis for decision develops the
initial tendency to follow the military court's approach which requires that a procedurally superior court be available if the court
martial is to be denied. The emphasis of past Supreme Court decisions, however, seems to suggest that this preoccupation with comparative procedures is not an appropriate component of the analysis.
The O'Callahan opinion itself, as supported by the conclusions
of the Reid line of cases,64 indicates an apparent disregard for the
procedural adequacy of alternative courts. While the Court has expressed in these cases its dissatisfaction with the procedural guarantees provided by the military courts, 65 it has voiced no corresponding concern for rights available in alternative courts. 66 The Court
seems to be more concerned with imposing restrictions on the extension of military jurisdiction than with ensuring a procedurally
competent tribunal for the trial of the accused.
The argument that the procedural adequacy of foreign courts
need not be examined is supported by at least one other important
62. In Keaton, the crime committed was of a type that had previously been determined to be service-connected, and consequently court-martial jurisdiction was established. Although the court recognized that it could "leave the matter there," 19
U.S.C.M.A. at 67, it nonetheless advanced the dicta that foreign courts are not acceptable alternatives.
6!1. This Note will examine the procedural adequacy of foreign courts only insofar
as those courts may serve as a basis for restricting military jurisdiction. No attempt
will be made to examine foreign courts for the purpose of passing judgment on the
propriety of granting those courts original jurisdiction over American servicemen.
64. See note 33 supra.
65. See, e.g., the quote from Quarles cited in note 5 supra.
66. A forceful argument can be made, however, that the Reid cases are distinguishable because they involved status rather than service-connection. See text accompanying note 34 supra. Furthermore, there would seem to have been no need for Justice
Douglas to mention specifically the adequacy of procedures in O'Callahan, since the
result of the denial of court-martial jurisdiction in that case was that the petitioner
then became subject to the jurisdiction of a federal district court.
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Supreme Court decision. In that case, Wilson v. Girard, 67 the Court
upheld a SOFA which provided for the waiver of jurisdiction by
the United States over American military personnel serving in
Japan. Indeed, the mere existence of the SOFA provisions, with
their allocations of criminal jurisdiction to the courts of foreign
nations, seems to indicate an acceptance by the United States of
the courts of these countries as permissible tribunals in which to
prosecute American offenders. 68 This inference is strengthened by
the decision in Girard, in which it was held constitutional for the
United States to waive its claim of primary jurisdiction in a case
over which it held concurrent jurisdiction with Japan, even though
such a waiver would surrender the accused soldier to Japanese authorities for trial. 69 Both the SOFAs and the Girard decision, then,
serve to sustain the conclusion gleaned from O'Callahan and the
Reid line that comparing procedures is irrelevant.
The decision in Girard was based on the holding that a "sovereign
nation has exclusive jurisdiction to punish offenses against its laws
committed within its borders, unless it expressly or impliedly consents to surrender its jurisdiction,"70 and that since Japan had retained concurrent jurisdiction over the crimes involved, the waiver
provision was constitutional as applied. There was no discussion of
the procedural safeguards afforded by the Japanese tribunals, much
less a comparison of Japanese procedural guarantees with those constitutionally mandated in the United States; rather, the decision
seems to have been on the above-stated broader principles of international law. Thus, it appears from the reasoning of Wilson v.
67. 354 U.S. 524 (1957).
68. It should be noted that the NATO SOFA seeks to guarantee an accused at
least some degree of procedural fairness in foreign courts. Art. VII, 1f 9 provides:
Whenever a member of a force or civilian component or a dependent is prosecuted under the jurisdiction of a receiving State he shall be entitled
(a) to a prompt and speedy trial;
(b) to be informed, in advance of trial, of the specific charge or charges made
against him;
(c) to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
(d) to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favour, if they are
within the jurisdiction of the receiving State;
(e) to have legal representation of his own choice for his defence or to have free
or assisted legal representation under the conditions prevailing for the time
being in the receiving State;
(f) if he considers it necessary, to have the services of a competent interpreter;
and
(g) to communicate with a representative of the Government of the sending State
and, when rules of the court permit, to have such a representative present at
his trial.
69. The Japanese SOFA, Protocol To Amend Art. XVII of the Administrative
Agreement Under Art. III of the Security Treaty Between the United States of America
and Japan, Sept. 29, 1953, [1953] 4 U.S.T. 1846, T.I.A.S. No. 2848, is substantially similar, in all relevant respects, to the comparable provisions of the NATO SOFA.
70. 354 U.S. at 529. This issue was considered a difficult one prior to this per curiam
decision. See Re, The NATO Status of Forces Agreement and International Law, 50 Nw.
U. L REv. 349 (1955).
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Girard that the adequacy of foreign procedural safeguards is to be
considered irrelevant and that the Supreme Court has by negative
implication accepted foreign civil courts, as restricted by the procedural guarantees of the SOFAs,71 as valid alternatives to trial by
military authorities.
Perhaps more important than the literal support provided by these
cases is the fact that the concept of the irrelevancy of alternative procedures seems to be consistent with the special-needs rationale for
applying the "service-connected" test of O'Callahan. It appears that
no overwhelming need of the military is satisfied by the presence of
constitutional safeguards in the foreign tribunals. Indeed, fear of
prosecution in procedurally unfair foreign tribunals could have a
deterrent effect upon criminal acts and could thereby enhance discipline. While it is true that flagrant violations of the basic right of
an accused might arguably have a depressing effect on morale, it
must be remembered that, at the present time, certain minimal safeguards must be provided in foreign courts, pursuant to the Status of
Forces Agreements.72 Thus, in light of the practicalities of the present
situation, military expediency does not appear to require a determination of the adequacy of the safeguards provided in those courts.
In summary, the emerging attitude of the Supreme Court concerning
the irrelevancy of comparative procedures, the apparent constitutional validity of the waiver of jurisdiction under the SOFA provisions, and the compatability of the special-needs standards with trial
in foreign courts, all serve to create a strong argument that a comparison of foreign procedures with those provided by the military is
not a necessary part of the "service-connected" test.
Despite the force of these contentions, however, several particularly persuasive practical considerations militate against the results
suggested by the above discussion. First, an anomaly is created by
failing to undertake a comparison of procedural rights. The Court
in O'Callahan seems to have determined that whenever the crime
involved bears no relationship to the military, a court-martial is in
derogation of the accused's specific constitutional rights to a grandjury indictment and to trial by jury. Yet in such circumstances a foreign tribunal becomes the forum in which the offender is fried; and
even though the decision in Wilson v. Girard apparently recognized
trial in foreign courts as an acceptable alternative to a military
trial, 78 these tribunals nonetheless frequently deny these same specific rights.74 Thus, the offender is put into the seemingly anomalous
position of being denied one forum solely because it fails to provide
71. See note 68 supra, spelling out these procedural protections.
72. Id.
73, See text accompanying notes 67-71 supra.
74, See Schwenk Comparative Study of the Law of Criminal Procedure in NATO
Cottntries Under the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, 35 N.C. L. REV. 358 (1957).
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the necessary procedural safeguards, and being placed into another
forum which may fail to provide the same safeguards. If the denial
of these two specific rights-grand-jury indictment and trial by jury
-is considered to be the basis for limiting military jurisdiction, it is
unclear what rights of the accused are being protected by such a
limitation when the accused will be denied the same rights regardless
of the forum utilized.
If the O'Callahan decision can be considered to rest not on the
fact that a court-martial may deny an accused specifically enumerated
rights, but rather on the broader grounds of the inherent inability
of military tribunals to provide a trial that is fundamentally fair, 7G
less of an enigma is created. Under such an interpretation, it appears
that while the procedures employed in the foreign courts may not
conform to the specifications of the American Constitution, they
would nevertheless be subject to an analysis of fairness of the resulting trials. Even if the decision is deemed to have been based on these
broader grounds, however, concern for the rights of the accused seems
to require an examination of the foreign courts in order to ensure
that they can provide the fair trial that the military has been adjudged incapable of guaranteeing.
Thus, in many circumstances, there is a seemingly irreconcilable
conflict between the desire to contain military jurisdiction within its
permissible sphere and the inability to protect the procedural rights
of the accused by so limiting the military's jurisdiction. From this
conflict emerges the question whether the often negligible advantages
gained by restricting court-martial jurisdiction can in a particular
country justify that restriction. In the absence of a comparison of
procedures in order to determine the extent of protection afforded
to the accused in each system, the denial of court-martial jurisdiction
for the mere sake of restricting the range of military cognizance seems
to be a futile effort.
.
A second practical objection to the failure to investigate alternative procedures is derived from the fact that, in many instances, servicemen are in a foreign country, if not against their will, at least
not of their mm volition. Finding themselves so situated, they find
further that they have become subject in all their nonservice activities
to a foreign tribunal which may offer them even fewer safeguards at
trial than would a military tribunal. This situation is aggravated in
the case of a draftee who not only is abroad against his will, but also
is in the armed forces involuntarily. The inequities created by these
circumstances call forth the basic question whether the United States
can or should be permitted to compel its servicemen to become subject to judicial procedures not responsive to the limitations of the
American Constitution. While the constitutionality of such a sub75. See note 15 supra.
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jection has apparently been upheld by Wilson v. Girard,16 the inequities of practical application are not thereby remedied, and these
bothersome ethical questions persist.
Third, practical consideration must be given to the influence
exerted by the Court of Military Appeals in adopting the position
that foreign courts are not acceptable alternatives because they fail
to provide those critical procedural safeguards found to be lacking
in military courts.77 From this determination, it is clear that the
Court of Military Appeals has adopted the view that O'Callahan
rested to an extent on the availability of a constitutionally adequate
civil court.78 While the relative importance of the military court's
decision is not easily ascertained, it may safely be assumed that its
holdings will not fail to exert some degree of influence on the ultimate disposition of the matter79 and will thus strengthen the case for
requiring a comparison of procedures.
Therefore, despite the notion that the military's special needs
do not seem to require constitutionally sufficient alternatives, and
despite at least some case authority for the proposition that comparative procedures are irrelevant to jurisdictional decisions, there are
several serious problems presented by a proposal to divest the military of jurisdiction without considering the constitutional adequacy
of procedural safeguards provided by foreign civilian courts: (1) the
anomaly of denying one court in deference to another which would
be deemed inadequate under similar scrutinization; (2) the dubious
propriety of compelling persons to serve in places where no constitutionally adequate tribunals are available; and (3) the difficulty in
reconciling a proposal to ignore comparative procedures with decisions by the Court of Military Appeals which read O'Callahan to
require an alternative forum that provides for the specific rights of
grand-jury indictment and trial by jury. It seems, then, that before
deciding to divest the military of jurisdiciton, there must be an examination of procedures afforded by the foreign courts.80
B. Procedural Safeguards in Foreign Courts

As is shown by the above analysis, there are formidable arguments
both for and against requiring scrutinization of the procedural rights
provided by alternative courts. The practical significance of this confrontation, however, may arguably be diminished by the existence
76. See the discussion in text accompanying note 67 supra.
77. See text accompanying notes 59-61 supra.
78. Id.
79. See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra.
80. In view of the additional judicial resources which would be required in order
to undertake a meaningful comparative analysis of foreign procedures, the possibility
exists that some courts may simply avoid difficulties by ruling in favor of military
jurisdiction.
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of two factors within the system of Status of Forces Agreements now
in effect. The first factor is that the NATO SOFA and the other similar SOFAs contain a section for certain fundamental procedural
guarantees. The second mitigating factor is the high degree of sophistication reached in the judicial procedures of many countries in
which American troops are stationed.
In this connection, several commentators have attempted to demonstrate that the combination of these two factors has largely eliminated fears of an unjust trial in a foreign court. 81 1,Vhile several basic
constitutional guarantees are omitted from the SOFA provisions,82
objections based on these omissions are largely met by the fact that
a "highly developed system of jurisprudence"83 prevails in many of
the countries involved.84 Indeed, an extensive study, made in 1957,
of comparative criminal procedures in the NATO countries concluded that the over-all protection provided in trials in those countries is "on balance equal to that granted by the U.S. Constitution."811
Moreover, to the extent that the SOFA and existing procedures
fail to provide adequate protection to an American accused of a
crime in a foreign country, the United States is not helpless to protect
him. Primary in the assurance that travesties of justice do not proceed
unchecked is a practice that has evolved from the provision in the
NATO SOFA which entitles an accused in a foreign court to the right
"to communicate with a representative of the Government of the
sending State and when the rl!les of the court permit, to have such
a representative present at his trial." 86 In American practice, the
representative allowed under this section has been referred to as a
"trial observer." 87 Despite the theoretical possibility that the host
nation could legally exclude the trial observer, it appears that such
observers are rarely barred from foreign judicial proceedings 88 and
that therefore they are available for protection in the vast majority
of cases. While it has been suggested that trial observers could be
81. See Levie, The NATO Status of Forces Agreement: Legal Safeguards for American
Servicemen, 44 A.B.A.J. 322 (1958); Ning, Due Process and the Sino-American Status of
Forces Amendment, 17 AM. J. COMP, L. 94 (1969); Schwenk, supra note 74; Ward,
Criminal Law and Jurisdiction over American Servicemen in Japan, 52 A.B.A.J. 61
(1966).
82. 99 CONG. REc. 8732 (1953) (remarks of Senator McCarran).
83. See Re, supra note 70, at 360.
84. See Levie, supra note 81; Re, supra note 70; Schwenk, supra note 74; ·ward,
supra note 81. It can be contended, however, that a highly developed system of jurisprudence, at least by American standards, exists only in '\Vestern countries. See text
accompanying notes 109-14 infra.
85. See Schwenk, supra note 74, at 378.
86. NATO SOFA art. VII, ,I 9(g). See note 68 supra.
87. Williams, An American's Trial in a Foreign Court: The Role of the Military's
Trial Observer, 34 MILITARY L. REv. I (1966), provides an extensive study of the functions of the trial observer.
88. Levie, supra note 81, at 323-24.
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utilized much more effectively than they are under present practice,89
they do serve to ensure that, as a minimum, someone is present at
the trial who is presumably trained to recognize encroachments on
the rights of the accused and whose duty it is to report such deviations to proper United States authorities in order that corrective
steps may be taken. 00
If deviations from the prescribed SOFA procedures are exposed,
further measures for the rectification of these departures must be
instituted. One obvious measure is diplomatic intervention. 91 While
this extreme measure seems to be justified to correct only the very
serious departures from required procedures, it appears to be an
effective tool in ensuring that those deviations are corrected. Also
available is the provision in the NATO SOFA which requires the
host country with primary jurisdiction to give "sympathetic consideration" to a request by the sending state for a waiver of jurisdiction, so long as the sending state "considers such waiver to be of
particular importance.'' 92 Therefore, in situations in which there is
concurrent jurisdiction, this fortified request for a waiver seems to
provide an effective safeguard against digressions from the required
procedure. As an additional protection, the NATO SOFA provides
that when such waivers are denied, the military commanders are to
seek recourse through diplomatic channels.93 Although these safeguards-the use of a trial observer, diplomatic intervention, and
waiver request-do nor fulfill the standards of the United States
Constitution, they serve at least to enhance the opportunity for an
accused serviceman to receive a fair trial in a foreign court.
As a practical matter, then, it appears that the combination of
the various safeguards presented above have resulted in a generally
operable and acceptable system and that the rights of an accused are
not appreciably diminished in a trial in a foreign court. The judicial
objection to that system has been virtually nonexistent; 94 and when
89. See Williams, supra note 87.
90. Id,
91. Girard, supra note 23, at 507 n.215.
92. NATO SOFA art. VII, ,I 3(c), supra note 41.
93. See Levie, supra note 81, at 322. Since the sending state has jurisdiction only
over persons "subject to the military law of that State" [NATO SOFA art. VII, ,i l(a)
(emphasis added)], there seems to be some question whether the United States may
rightfully request a waiver of jurisdiction when the military courts are closed. It has
been suggested-and it seems validly so-that even if the military courts are closed,
jurisdiction is retained for purposes of dispensing administrative sanctions, and that
a waiver request may be based on that jurisdiction. See Williams, supra note 87, at 17.
Moreover, if an adequate foreign procedure is determined to be a requisite element
of the alternative-forum requirement, military jurisdiction would be reinstated when
the foreign court fails to provide the required procedures and the waiver request could
be based thereon.
94. There appear to be no recorded cases holding invalid a SOFA's allocation of
jurisdiction.
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the United States' toleration of foreign jurisdiction has been questioned, the constitutional validity of the SOFA provisions has been
upheld. 95 Thus, it might seem that since the system, as it has operated,
has apparently been adjudged constitutionally acceptable, there is
little remaining objection to the relegation of a few more servicemen
to the jurisdiction of foreign tribunals by the application abroad of
the "service-connected" test of O'Callahan.
On the other hand, the effectiveness of these factors in mitigating
objections to foreign procedures has been significantly diminished
by the relatively recent constitutional developments in the area of
procedural due process. Before Reid, the Supreme Court had adhered
to a subjective interpretation of what rights were fundamental to a
fair trial; there was no necessary correlation between the rights imposed by the Bill of Rights on the federal government and those held
applicable to the states by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 96 Indeed, the only comprehensive study concerning the
constitutional adequacy of foreign procedures-the study which
adopted the conclusion that foreign procedures are substantially
equal to those exercised by the states97-was based on this interpretation of the fourteenth amendment.98 In recent years, however, it has
been determined, by a process of selective incorporation, that certain
of the procedural guarantees of the Bill of Rights are a fortiori essential to a fair trial and are thereby incorporated into the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment.99 Substantially all of the procedural requirements of the Bill of Rights are now considered to be
vital to the concept of a fair trial and have been imp!Jsed on the states
by this process.100
95. Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957).
96. The following cases are frequently cited in support of this proposition. Each
held that a specific right imposed in federal courts by the Bill of Rights was not
fundamental to the guarantee of a fair trial nor "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty" [Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)], so as to make it applicable to
the states under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment: Irvine v. Califor•
nia, 347 U.S. 128 (1954) (exclusion of evidence obtained by unreasonable search and
seizure); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (privilege against self-incrimination);
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (double jeopardy); Twining v. New Jersey,
211 U.S. 78 (1908); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900) (trial by twelve-man jm1·);
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (indictment by grand jury).
97. See note 85 supra and accompan}ing text.
98. See Schwenk, supra note 74.
99. Apparently, the first Supreme Court case adopting tl1e incorporation doctrine
was Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I (1964), which overruled Twining and Adamson. In
that case, the Court held that "the Fifth Amendment's exception from compulsory
self-incrimination is also protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment
by the States." 378 U.S. at 6. For subsequent cases utilizing the doctrine, sec note 100

infra.
100. See the discussion of Malloy v. Hogan, 379 U.S. I (1964), in note 99 supra. See
also the following cases making the indicated rights compulsory on the states: Benton
v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (double jeopardy); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968) (right to trial by jury in criminal cases); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)
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The importance for present purposes of this change in the attitude of the Supreme Court is embodied in the concept of a fair trial
as it is applied to foreign courts. While foreign civil courts may once
have been considered to have provided fair trials, it appears that due
to the failure of those courts to provide for the specific guarantees
of the American Bill of Rights, the resulting trials would not be considered fair under the recent Supreme Court interpretations. Hence,
much of the importance of what was written about the fairness of
treatment afforded American servicemen in foreign courts has been
obviated by the new aspects attributed to the due process clause.
Nonetheless, even though applicable foreign procedures may fall
short of the recently developed constitutional standards, the impact
of the earlier attempts of foreign countries to establish in civilian
trials some of the basic elements of fairness remains viable to mitigate, at least to some degree, the inconsistencies encountered in advocating the irrelevancy of investigating the procedural provisions of
foreign courts.
C. Acceptability of Foreign Civil Courts as Alternative Tribunals
A comparison between trial in American military courts and that
in foreign civilian courts leaves one, at best, with a choice between
two constitutionally inadequate tribunals. Even where foreign legal
systems are roughly similar to the American model, such as in the
NATO countries, it seems that foreign courts possess certain procedural defects which render them at least as objectionable as American
courts-martial. These constitutional infirmities are emphasized by
the recent trend of decisions incorporating selected provisions of the
Bill of Rights into the requirements of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Indeed, the procedural defects in foreign
courts render those courts susceptible to the same criticism that was
levelled at military courts in O'Callahan. The Court's objection in
that case to military procedure rested largely on the incompetency of
military courts to deal with the "nice subtleties of constitutional
law"; 101 and it is doubtful that foreign courts, regardless of their
basic fairness, are any more adept than are military courts at dealing
with those "nice subtleties." Basically, then, foreign and military
tribunals are comparable and equally inadequate.
(right of confrontation under sixth amendment); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609
(1965) (privilege against compulsory self-incrimination-adverse comment on failure to
testify not permitted); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusion of evidence obtained by unlawful search and seizure). Note that the requirement for indictment by
grand jury has not yet been so incorporated. Thus, although the absence of this
guarantee was a basic reason in O'Callahan for objection to the military trial, it has
not yet been made compulsory on the states.
IOI. 395 U.S. at 265.
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Faced with a choice between two inadequate tribunals, the initial
urge may be to select the foreign civilian court. The allocation of
jurisdiction by the Status of Forces Agreements seems to provide a
somewhat workable method for defining service-connection abroada method with established channels for compromising differences of
opinion. The provisions allowing for waiver of jurisdiction by the
United States in deference to foreign demands have been upheld
as constitutional,102 thereby affirming the United States' ability to
subject its citizens to foreign trials, even though foreign courts may
possess some procedural infirmities. Thus, this adoption of the SOFA
assignment of jurisdiction could be a constitutionally acceptable
method of applying the "service-connected" test of O'Callahan to
limit military jurisdiction overseas. Moreover, the traditional approach of the Supreme Court seems to affirm this reliance on foreign
courts as alternatives to military tribunals,103 and such an approach
is consistent with the preservation of the military's special needs. 104
Nevertheless, it is doubtful that such a course of action should be
followed. Fundamental in the arguments against that approach is
the basic inconsistency of denying one court in deference to another,
when both offer comparable procedural safeguards. Moreover, there
is at least some possibility of review by American civil courts to correct military courts' flagrant departures from fairness. 1015 In addition,
denying the United States the ability to control its own servicemen
can certainly not be expected to have any affirmative effect on the
United States' relationship with the host nation. Indeed, there could
be adverse effects on that relationship, since the total burden for
prosecuting crimes unrelated to the military ,vould suddenly be
placed on foreign authorities, and since those restraints imposed by
the internal disciplinary structure of the armed forces would accordingly be obstructed. Of course, the host country can rightfully decline
to prosecute crimes over which it has jurisdiction,106 thereby reinstating military jurisdiction for want of an alternative. But to so
permit the whims of the host government to be the basis of the attachment of jurisdiction is not a favorable method of operation.
Perhaps more important in this regard, it is questionable whether
a serviceman-if he is going to be placed in a constitutionally deficient court-should be tried in foreign courts where unfamiliar procedures and customs, language and communications problems, and
102. Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957). See also text accompanying notes 63-64
supra.
103. See the discussion at note 64 supra.
104. See p. 1033 supra.
105. See generally Bishop, The Quality of Military Justice, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22,
1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 37.
106. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
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the possibility of confinement in a foreign land lend considerably to
the discomfort associated with being tried in any setting. While
it has been shown above that these £ears may be largely exaggerated,107
they nevertheless have been expressed by persons presumably knowledgeable in the workings of international procedures.1° 8
It could perhaps be argued that there is no valid reason for providing protection from the subjective fears surrounding foreign trial
for servicemen, because under the Reid doctrine and under standard
principles of international law, no similar protections are furnished
for civilians accompanying the armed forces abroad. One obvious
answer to this argument rests on the greater degree of compulsion
exerted by the United States in placing servicemen in the foreign
setting. Since the accused soldier has been subjected to the foreign
jurisdiction as a direct result of his having been commanded by the
United States military to serve there, it seems that the same commanding authority should protect him from undesirable treatment.
This point takes on added significance in the case of a draftee. While
there is admittedly a certain degree of institutional or governmental
coercion involved in placing on foreign soil civilians who are accompanying the armed forces, the compulsion in those circumstances is
much less direct and pronounced than it is in the case of servicemen.
In addition, there is a basic distinction between the grounds for
denying military jurisdiction in each situation. The initial question
in the determination of jurisdiction is one of status as a member of
the armed forces. Since civilians fail to meet this requirement, they
are improper subjects for a military trial. Servicemen, however, meet
the initial status test; and consequently military jurisdiction is denied
only when the crime is not service-connected and thus does not create
a special need for a military trial. Since this special-need test is subjective and presumably more flexible than is the status test, it is
necessary in determining the adequacy of foreign courts as alternative
tribunals for trying servicemen, to give more weight to the effect of
the unfamiliar procedures and customs surrounding foreign trial.
Finally, it should be noted that in some countries the procedural
safeguards provided in an American court-martial are clearly superior
to procedures used in trials in local civilian courts. Much of the preceding discussion has focused on the NATO model and has assumed
that foreign and military court systems are equally objectionable
since they both fail to secure to the accused the full range of Ameri107. See notes 81-95 supra and accompanying text.
108. See the objections of the late Senator McCarran, supra note 82, to the adoption
of the NATO SOFA. See also the statement by Senator Bricker that the NATO SOFA
"reflects a callous disregard for the rights of American Armed Forces Personnel." 99
CONG, R!:c. 4659 (1953). See also Justice Clark's dissent in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. I,
89 (1957).
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can constitutional guarantees. This assumption is somewhat inaccurate, however, because it views all constitutionally deficient courts as
equally infirm.
There are two factors which tend to make the civil courts of some
countries more objectionable than are military courts. The first is
the conception that the highly lauded ability of foreign courts to
produce fair trials is based largely on generalizations about procedures practiced in those nations that are highly influenced by ·western culture.109 In areas in which Western influence is less dominant,
however, traditional societal values relevant to the precepts of fairness vary, and the approximation of American constitutional guarantees is often diminished.110 The second and more pervasive factor is
the notion that the standards of fairness presently exercised by courtsmartial operate to provide a much more desirable tribunal than is
indicated by the condescending attitude of Justice Douglas in O'Callahan.111 A combination of the express statutory recognition of procedural rights112 and expansive interpretations by the Court of Military Appeals113 has greatly enhanced the basic fairness of military
courts. 114 In any given situation, therefore, either or both of the
above factors may operate to make the military court a less objectionable forum than that which is available in the particular foreign
system.
In summary, then, there are conflicting arguments concerning the
acceptability of foreign civilian courts. The utilization of such courts
as alternatives to military tribunals is strongly suggested by the mere
existence of the SOFA allocations of jurisdiction. The constitutional
approval of these allocations, together with the Court's traditional
approach115 and its resulting compliance with special military exigencies, weigh heavily in favor of the acceptance of foreign courts as
viable alternatives. Even though this approach may seem appropriate
under such a theoretical analysis, ho-wever, the relative absence of
109. See, e.g., Schwenk, supra note 74, using as his basis of comparison the pro•
cedures practiced in NATO nations; cf. text accompanying notes 83-85 supra.
ll0. See generally Ning, supra note 81.
lll. See note 5 supra, especially Nelson & Westbrook at 56-64.
ll2. See, e.g., UCMJ art. 32, 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1964) (right to investigation); UCMJ
art. 27, 10 U.S.C. § 827 (1964), as amended (Supp. IV, 1965-1968) (right to counsel).
ll3. See, e.g., United States v. Sweeney, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 599, 34 C.M.R. 379 (1964)
(right to compulsory process); United States v. Schalck, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 371, 34 C.M.R.
151 (1964) (right to a speedy trial); United States v. Vierra, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 48, 33 C.M.R.
260 (1963) (right of protection against unreasonable searches and seizures); United
States v. Kemp, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 89, 32 C.M.R. 89 (1962) (privilege against self-incrimination); United States v. Brown, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 251, 22 C.M.R. 41 {1962) (right to public
trial); United States v. Jacoby, ll U.S.C.M.A. 428, 29 C.M.R. 244 (1960) (right to confront witnesses).
ll4. See Nelson & 'Westbrook, supra note 5, at 56-64, enumerating those specific
safeguards incorporated into a military trial.
ll5. See notes 64-71 supra and accompanying text.
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any practical benefits to be gained by placing servicemen in foreign
courts weighs just as heavily against adopting foreign courts as acceptable alternative forums under the O'Callahan test. If the procedural deficiencies of foreign and military courts are comparable,
the accused gains no benefit from being tried in a foreign court.
Indeed, the practical distress incurred by the accused in a foreign
trial may be expected to have quite the opposite effect, and in some
countries the court-martial is clearly the preferable forum from a
procedural standpoint. From a consideration of these factors, therefore, it seems that the alternative of trial in foreign civilian courts
should not be a permissible foundation upon which to base the
denial of military jurisdiction. That result is easily reached by a
literal reading of Justice Douglas' opinion in O'Callahan, and it is
submitted that this strict reading ought to be given.
VJ.

Al\IERICAN CIVILIAN COURTS AS AVAILABLE ALTERNATIVE FORA

Once foreign civilian courts have been examined as possible alternatives, the next step is to determine whether American tribunals or
procedures are available or can be made available to eradicate the
military's special needs and thereby to negate the necessity for implementing the military's judicial apparatus in order to deal with crimes
committed abroad which are unrelated to the military. American
tribunals represent potential alternatives to courts-martial in two contexts. First, insofar as foreign civilian courts are considered unacceptable alternative tribunals, the availability of an American tribunal
might be a basis for frustrating military jurisdiction, regardless of
whether the relevant SOFA allocates jurisdiction over the crime concurrently to the host nation and the United States or exclusively to the
United States. Second, even to the extent that foreign courts may be
deemed acceptable, American alternatives may in some instances represent the only basis for depriving the military of jurisdiction. Those
instances arise because of the jurisdictional gap created either by a
grant under the applicable SOFA of exclusive jurisdiction to the
United States, 116 or by the host country's reluctance to prosecute
crimes over which it shares concurrent jurisdiction with the United
States. If the United States has been given exclusive jurisdiction over
a particular crime by the SOFA provisions, and if that offense is otherwise unrelated to military service, there exists no readily apparent
foreign tribunal in which to try the offender. Therefore, if courtmartial jurisdiction is to be restrained, it is necessary to satisfy the
military exigencies by employing an American tribunal outside the
military system. Furthermore, and perhaps more significantly, the im116. See Ehrenhaft, supra note 45, at 276-80; cf. the discussion of this gap in text
accompanying note 46 supra. See also the NATO SOFA provisions set out in notes
40-41 supra.
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portance of this gap is heightened by the reluctance often shovm by
foreign authorities to prosecute crimes which are placed under concurrent jurisdiction by the SOFA provisions, but which primarily involve American interests.117 To the extent that foreign courts decline
to try such offenses, there is again a failure of available alternatives
unless American civil tribunals are able to bridge the "jurisdictional
gap."
Since the procedures of the American tribunals under consideration are subject to constitutional limitations, no discussion of procedural adequacy is necessary, as it is in the case of foreign courts; and
consequently the focus of present discussion may be centered on the
search for viable alternatives and on the practical difficulties encountered in their implementation. By and large, American civilian courts
are not presently available in foreign countries, and so specific governmental action is required in order for them to be established.
Thus, the desirability of each alternative set forth below must be
tempered with an understanding of the difficulties involved in motivating the appropriate authorities to take the necessary action. For
example, the establishment of American tribunals would in every
case deprive the host country of existing jurisdiction or othenvise
infringe on the host nation's sovereignty and consequently would
require delicate diplomatic negotiations. This difficulty is intensified
by the fact that the motivating force behind such action would
necessarily be based on a desire to thwart military jurisdiction-a
motive which is certainly not uniformly possessed by present governmental leadership.
While a wide variety of proposals have been advanced for the
use of American civilian procedures to replace courts-martial in situations in which military jurisdiction has been curtailed,118 the alternative suggestions set forth below are limited to those which seem most
easily accessible and most relevant to the problems created by the
ramifications of O'Callahan.
A. American Courts Sitting Abroad

A proposal which seems initially to be a practicable method of
supplementing court-martial jurisdiction in foreign countries when
special military needs do not otherwise dictate a military trial, is
the creation of American federal courts to hear cases in the foreign
countries.119 Two basic objections, however, override the feasibility
of such an alternative. First, the existing Status of Forces Agreements
providing for the encroachment by the American military on an area
117. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
118. See, e.g., Ehrenhaft, supra note 45, at 280·85; Girard, supra note 2!l, at 503-19.
119. See Ehrenhaft, supra note 45, at 282.
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of inherent foreign jurisdiction were obtained only after extensive
negotiation. 120 The implementation of overseas American courts
would further encroach on the host country's jurisdiction, and further negotiating would be required. The likelihood of the receptiveness of these countries to such extended encroachment is at best
doubtful.1 21 Second, there are serious questions as to how a jury of
unbiased peers, sufficiently independent of military influence, could
be selected by such a court. 122 Indeed, in view of the questionable
ability of these courts to provide such a basic constitutional safeguard
as the right to an unbiased jury,123 it seems inadvisable to enter into
extended negotiations seeking their establishment.
B. Domestic Federal Courts

Another alternative often advanced to handle the prosecution of
a serviceman who, while abroad, commits a crime unrelated to the
military, is to provide for trial in a federal district court sitting in
the United States. 124 While this alternative is apparently consistent
with principles of international law,125 as well as with the Constitution,126 the primary objection is the problem involved in the securing
of witnesses. Although it has been suggested that American citizens
could readily be persuaded or compelled to return to the United
States to testify, there is apparently no existing system to compel
foreign nationals to participate in trials conducted in the United
States, nor are their countries likely to favor the institution of such
a system.127 Moreover, it seems somewhat unconscionable to require
foreign citizens to suffer the inconvenience of being transported to
the United States in order to testify in the prosecution of a crime
committed on their own soil. At any rate, the cost and intricacies of
implementing such a system would be so great as to justify its utiliza120. See Hearings oii Status of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Armed
Forces, and Military Headquarters Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 83d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1953).
121. See Judge (now Chief Justice) Burger's dissent in United States ex rel.
Guagliardo v. McElroy, 259 F.2d 927, 939 n.26(d) (D.C. Cir. 1958).
122. See Ehrenhaft, supra note 45, at 282. See also Everett, supra note 23, at 375,
expressing the opinion that it would be "impossible in these circumstances to empanel
a jury conforming to sixth-amendment qualifications. A serviceman, however, may
prefer that the jury be under military influence so that they might more easily identify
with him, especially in the overseas context.
123. See Ehrenhaft, supra note 45, at 282; Girard, supra note 23, at 505.
124. Ehrenhaft, supra note 45, at 281; Girard, supra note 23, at 507.
125. See Girard, supra note 23, at 507-08, and cites contained therein.
126. Id. See also Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1932); United
States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922).
127. Girard, supra note 2!1, at 509-10.
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tion only in cases involving the gravest or most serious offenses.1:?8
However, in areas of concurrent jurisdiction, it appears that as the
gravity of the offense increases, the likelihood that the host country
would take jurisdiction also increases. Nevertheless, in the area of
exclusive American jurisdiction, the host country's willingness to
prosecute is irrelevant, and consequently trial in a domestic federal
court remains a viable alternative. It seems, therefore, that trial in
domestic federal courts may be a feasible and effective, even if intricate, device for disposing of some of the more serious offenses. 129
However, because it has been held by the Supreme Court that the
"legislation of the Congress, unless the contrary intent appears, is
construed to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States,"130 the vesting of domestic federal courts with power
to hear such cases would require the augmentation of the United
States' criminal law codes to include crimes committed by citizens
in foreign lands.
-

C. United States Magistrates' Courts and the Petty-Offense
Exception
Since minor or petty offenses seem to be separable from more
serious crimes in terms both of practical variations and of differences
in the procedural safeguards required in the prosecution of each,131
a plan has been advanced providing for the separate treatment of
petty offenses committed abroad by United States servicemen; those
offenses would be tried in special United States Magistrates'
Courts.132
At the outset, however, the establishment of commissioner's courts
sitting abroad seems to be an unaceptable method of escaping the
predicament of O'Callahan. The basic problem, similar to that discussed with regard to establishing ordinary federal courts sitting
abroad,133 is one of gaining acceptance by the host country. But perhaps more important, because the proposed magistrates' courts
128. Ehrenhaft, supra note 45, at 281.
129. See Girard, supra note 23, at 509, where, in connection with an examination
of the feasibility of domestic federal courts as alternative fora, the author concluded:
"I believe the cost, delay, and disruptive effect on military operations of trial in the
United States has been greatly exaggerated."
130. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932). See also Girard, supra
note 23, at 507.
131. See 2 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDUR!:: CRIMINAL § 371 (1969);
Kaye, Petty Offenders Have No Peers, 26 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 245 (1959); Nelson &: Westbrook, supra note 5, at 34; The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARv. L. R.Ev. 63, 149
(1968).
132. 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-39 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). See Ehrenhaft, supra note 45, at 285.
133. See te.xt accompanying note 121 supra.
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would handle only petty offenses, they would not constitutionally be
required to provide for grand jury indictment and jury trial. 134 Accordingly, they seem to be subject to an inability to provide the accused serviceman with the benefits denied him in the military
tribunals. In this respect, the objection to these proposed magistrates' courts comes perilously near to the objection voiced against
foreign courts. 135 Even though the severity of removing the serviceman from the grasp of the military is lessened considerably by the
fact that he does not thereby become subject to the importunities of
foreign trial and confinement, the underlying anomaly persists. As
in the case of foreign civilian courts, the serviceman would be removed from one court that lacks requisite constitutional safeguards
and placed in another, yet more unfamiliar, tribunal which lacks
the same safeguards.
Moreover, it is possible that O'Callahan will be interpreted to
allow a petty-offense exception for the military disposition of minor
offenses, thereby obviating the need for an American civil tribunal,
such as the magistrates' court, to handle such offenses. In this
regard, it has been suggested by at least two commentators that petty
offenses should be exempted from examination under the "serviceconnected" test formulated in O'Callahan. 136 Indeed, the Court of
Military Appeals, consistent with its approach to foreign alternatives,
has specifically recognized such an exception, holding that the reach
of military jurisdiction "encompasses the trial of those petty offenses,
for which, in civil life, the accused would not be entitled to the constitutional protections of grand-jury indictment and jury trial." 137
Since the defendant in a case involving petty offense would not enjoy
increased procedural safeguards in a civilian tribunal, it seems inconsistent to deny military jurisdiction for failure to provide those safeguards. Therefore, since the court-martial is apparently an acceptable
forum for dealing with petty offenses,138 the inducement for the establishment of specialized tribunals to deal with petty offenses is
further allayed. Under the petty-offense exception, the military undoubtedly would continue to refer petty offenses to its own courtsmartial, and the magistrates' courts would not handle enough cases
to justify their existence.
134. See note 131 supra.
135. See text accompanying notes 74-79 supra.
136. Nelson &: Westbrook, supra note 5, at 34-39.
137. United States v. Sharkey, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 26, 28, 41 C.M.R. 26 (1969).
138. Petty offenders customarily are tried by the military authorities in summary
and special courts-martial. See Nelson &: 'Westbrook, supra note 5, at 36-37. Administrative sanctions for minor offenses also are authorized by UCMJ art. 15, IO
U.S.C. § 815 (1964), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). These sanctions include the
nonjudicial deprivation of privileges and the imposition of certain restrictions. They
are offered to the offender as a voluntary alternative to court-martial.
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D. Feasibility of American Courts as Alternative Fora
Of all the American tribunals which are possible alternatives to
military courts, only the federal court sitting in the United States
is an acceptable alternative. While the use of such courts to handle
crimes committed overseas gives rise to numerous difficulties, it has
been seriously advanced as an efficacious system for dealing with
some very serious offenses.139 The implementation of such a scheme,
however, requires specific legislative action, and the instigation of
such action is replete with further obstacles. At best, therefore, this
alternative is a future solution which must await specific action to
effect its implementation.
The feasibility of the other suggseted American tribunals is
severely limited. The establishment of American courts abroad is
generally considered to be impracticable. To the extent that magistrates' courts sitting abroad could otherwise be made feasible,
their utility is prohibitively limited, since they would be effective
only in the area of petty offenses, where it is seriously doubtful that
military jurisdiction need be, or can be, restricted at all. Thus, it
seems that American courts are not currently available to remove
the need of the military to prosecute offenders in its own court
system.

VII.

CONCLUSION

In formulating a final determination as to the applicability of
O'Callahan v. Parker to crimes committed by servicemen while stationed abroad, one must come to a conclusion as to the overriding
purpose of the Court in restricting military jurisdiction. If the aim of
O'Callahan was to preserve the individual constitutional guarantees
of the accused serviceman, then the approach of the Court of Military
Appeals in absolutely requiring a constitutionally acceptable alternative court before denying military jurisdiction seems appropriate. 140
If, however, O' Callahan is seen as an effort to define the range of
offensive conduct which may be governed by "Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces," 141 then the underlying purpose can be seen as the restriction of military power for
the mere sake of limiting the span of its jurisdictional comprehension,
and the Girard attitude of indifference toward alternative procedures appears to be more nearly correct.
This delineation of motives, however, may prove to be too simplistic, for neither interpretation seems to pay proper deference to
139. See notes 124-30 supra and accompanying text.
140. See text accompanying notes 58-60 supra.
141. This is the approach suggested at the text accompanying note 64 supra. Su
also Everett, supra note 9, at 893.
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the Court's unarticulated rationale in O'Callahan. Indeed, the Court
appears to have adopted a middle ground. Obviously, the Court was
motivated by a simple desire to restrict military jurisdiction. But this
distrust of military authority was tempered by a concern for the constitutional rights of the individual serviceman. The "service-connected" test, then, is the verbalization of the method which the Court
employed to prevent an overextension of the grasp of the military
in situations in which the objections raised by the fundamental procedural infirmities of the court-martial outweigh the special needs of
the military to preserve discipline. The approach of the Court of
Military Appeals places too much significance on these procedural
infirmities by elevating them to the level of primary concern and
absolutely requiring a procedurally superior alternative tribunal before restricting military jurisdiction; while the contrasting approach
-that is, that comparative procedures are irrelevant-is equally inappropriate because it fails to accord recognition to the practical
implications of relegating accused servicemen to tribunals that are
as imperfect as are military courts themselves.
Initially, an examination of available alternative tribunals suggests that foreign civilian courts provide an acceptable basis for
restricting court-martial jurisdiction, since the military's special needs
arguably will be fulfilled by any court which metes out punishment
for the offenses in question. However, the extraterritorial situs of the
crime reintroduces the practical relevance of comparative procedures,
since, absent the feasibility of handling the case in an American court,
the military courts and foreign civilian courts present, at best, equally
objectionable choices. In light of the complicating factors thus introduced by the intricacies of international relationships, there seems
to be little practical justification for the restriction of military jurisdiction for its own sake when no corresponding benefit is conferred
upon the individual serviceman. Furthermore, when there is a corresponding detriment suffered by the serviceman as a result of being
placed in an unfamiliar tribunal with no possibility of review in
American courts, the restriction of military jurisdiction is not only
unjustified but unconscionable as well.
Thus, it appears that the Court's basis for decision in O'Callahan
was a simple desire to restrict military authority, tempered by the
practical concerns for the resulting effects on the accused serviceman.
Weighing the basic arguments for the protection of the serviceman's
fundamental rights against the minimal advantages to be gained by
limiting military jurisdiction, it is submitted that the objections
discussed above should operate to make the O'Callahan doctrine inapplicable to offenses committed by servicemen abroad.

